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Since the mid-1980s, most Latin American countries have
undertaken far-reaching structural reform along the lines of
the so-called Washington Consensus. This article tests the
robustness of the empirical evidence provided by a variety
of studies in support of the reforms and their positive impact
on Latin American growth. The results are striking. No
reform has a robust positive correlation with growth,
investment or productivity in the region, and there is evidence
that some reforms, particularly labour market deregulation,
may actually be harming growth. The results also show that
the time effects for the period 1987-1995 were if anything
positive, contradicting the prevailing wisdom that the poor
economic performance seen in Latin America in the face of
numerous far-reaching structural reforms has been due to
an adverse international environment.
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“Economists have inherited from physical sciences the myth that
scientific inference is objective, and free of personal prejudice. This is





Since the mid-1980s, in the aftermath of the debt crisis,
most Latin American countries have rapidly liberalized
and internationalized their economies, along the lines
of the so-called Washington Consensus. Despite a whole
range of far-reaching structural reforms, however, and
notwithstanding a drop of 1.8% in per capita GDP during
1981-1985, per capita economic growth during 1986-
1995 was only 1.2% a year, whereas during the 1960s
and 1970s the region averaged rates of 2.5% and 2.4%,
respectively.1
In spite of this, a number of empirical studies have
set out to show that the structural reforms have had a
positive impact on regional growth, arguing that poor
economic performance has been due to a failure to
implement even deeper reforms, a lack of policy
complementarity,2 and international factors.
Specifically, the Inter-American Development
Bank (IDB, 1997), using policy indices representing five
areas of reform and panel data models, estimated that
the reforms had contributed 1.9% to the region’s
permanent growth and that further reform could still
contribute between 1.2% and 1.6%. According to the
IDB report, the reforms enhanced growth essentially by
improving resource allocation, a factor which was
estimated to have contributed 1.7% to permanent
growth, while there were found to be positive if modest
effects on investment. The report also found that,
contrary to common belief, the reforms had taken effect
rapidly, and accordingly it strongly recommended an
acceleration of the reform process.
The policy indices used by IDB have also been
employed in panel data growth regressions by Barrera
and Lora (1997) and Fernández-Arias and Montiel
(1997), who have reached conclusions similar to those
of IDB.3 In a worldwide cross-section study using three
policy indices, however, Aziz and Wescott (1997) found
that no single reform correlated robustly with growth.
They argued, though, that this result was due to the
unevenness of reforms among the different sectors, and
they found that policy complementarity, represented by
the difference between a central tendency and a
dispersion measure for the policy indices, was robustly
and positively correlated with growth. Lastly, Easterly,
Loayza and Montiel (1997), using six policy indices
and dynamic panel data models, concluded that the
reforms and their impact on the renewal of growth in
Latin America added up to an impressive achievement.
They put the region’s disappointing economic growth
down in part to negative international factors.
This paper tests the robustness of the correlation
between the structural reforms and Latin America’s
economic growth or its sources. It also tests the
robustness of the correlation between policy
complementarity and growth, and considers whether a
negative international environment harmed regional
growth. The study employs the same structural policy
indices and panel structure as the Inter-American
Development Bank (IDB, 1997). Thus, the panel is
composed of 19 Latin American countries, with four
periods representing three-year averages: 1984-1986,
1987-1989, 1990-1992 and 1993-1995. The countries
included in the study are Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominic Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Jamaica,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Paraguay, Peru, Trinidad and
Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The paper employs
panel models, while the estimation procedure controls
for fixed effects and endogeneity, and uses efficient two-
step generalized method of moments (GMM) estimators.
The test of robustness is the extreme bound analysis
method (EBA) suggested by Leamer (1983) and
1 World Bank data for 19 Latin American economies.
2 Policy complementarity basically means that the positive effect
of the reforms is conditioned by the heterogeneity of sectors.
Therefore, even if a country has brought in very far-reaching
economic reforms, their effect on growth will vanish if the level of
reform among different areas is too uneven.
3 In fact, the IDB 1997 Report (IDB, 1997, chapter II) basically
reproduces the findings of Barrera and Lora (1997).
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employed in growth regressions by Levine and Renelt
(1992).
The paper is organized as follows. Section II
describes the structural policy indices. Section III
highlights the importance of controlling for the time
effects and temporal trend problems of the panel under
consideration, illustrates the advantages of using panel
data models in growth regressions, and explains the
estimation procedure. Section IV discusses the EBA
methodology. Section V presents the data and models
to be used to perform the EBA and the different
classifications of the variables. Section VI reports the




One of the main obstacles to the quantitative evaluation
of the structural reforms implemented in Latin America
was always the lack of a well established methodology
for measuring the reform process. In order to quantify
the region’s reform process in a comprehensive manner,
Lora (1997) created the “structural policy index” (SPI).
The SPI is the arithmetic mean of five sectoral indices
representing: trade liberalization (TRADE), tax neutrality
(TAX), financial liberalization (FIN), privatization (PRIV)
and labour deregulation (LAB). In turn, each sectoral
index is the arithmetic mean of one or more policy
variables, whose values are normalized with respect to
the best and worst observation for that variable in the
entire set of countries and years (see appendix A).
Accordingly, each index can range from 0 to 1, and the
closer to 1, the more neutral the economic policy of
the country. Thus, the SPI and its five components are
proxies for the degree of free-market policy orientation.
Lastly, it is important to observe that the indices are
explicitly composed of policy variables and thus avoid
one of the main shortcomings of a number of previous
studies, which used expected reform outcomes as
proxies for the reforms.4
Using the SPI, table 1 shows the speed and depth
of the structural reforms carried out in Latin America
during 1985-1995 and the reform paths and rankings
of the different countries. In 10 years, the average SPI
for the region increased from 0.345 to 0.621. To
illustrate how quickly reform has taken place in some
countries, it need only be mentioned that in 1985 and
1990 Chile was the best example of a free-market
economy, but that in the space of just five years it
dropped to ninth place. The process has been so general
that the lowest SPI in 1995, Venezuela’s, would have
been the third highest in 1985.
The box-and-whisker diagrams (figure 1) show
the behaviour of every area of reform. The most
neutral policies –represented in the diagrams by higher
medians and lower dispersion– are in Latin America’s
external trade and financial sector. However, all areas
of reform show substantially higher medians than in
1985, albeit levels of privatization and labour
deregulation in 1995 still differed greatly among
countries.
4 Several studies use the assumed outcomes of reforms as proxies
for them, instead of using policy variables for this purpose. For
instance, Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997) explicitly state that
their reform proxies “should move in the qualitative direction
associated with reform…and should explain growth” (Easterly,
Loayza and Montiel, 1997, p. 293). Hence, the positive effect of
the reforms on growth is virtually taken for granted.
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TABLE 1
Latin America and the Caribbean: Structural policy index (SPI)
1985 1990 1995
SPI Rank SPI Rank SPI Rank
Argentina 0.367 4 0.476 12 0.679 5
Bolivia 0.343 6 0.548 5 0.721 1
Brazil 0.348 5 0.512 8 0.584 13
Chile 0.489 1 0.596 1 0.628 9
Colombia 0.443 3 0.549 4 0.590 12
Costa Rica 0.309 10 0.500 10 0.512 18
Dominican Republic 0.361 17 0.638 8
Ecuador 0.325 9 0.357 18 0.580 14
El Salvador 0.532 7 0.671 6
Guatemala 0.309 10 0.438 14 0.596 11
Honduras 0.450 13 0.548 17
Jamaica 0.573 3 0.684 4
Mexico 0.328 8 0.498 11 0.563 16
Nicaragua 0.216 14 0.391 15 0.643 7
Paraguay 0.336 7 0.548 5 0.625 10
Peru 0.232 13 0.252 19 0.712 3
Trinidad and Tobago 0.589 2 0.715 2
Uruguay 0.486 2 0.511 9 0.573 15
Venezuela 0.304 12 0.364 16 0.457 19



































































Latin America and the Caribbean: Development of each reform area
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III
Econometric issues
1. The temporal trend of growth, the interest rate
and the structural policy index
Although per capita growth in the region was low in 1985-
1995 compared with the 1960s and 1970s, it followed a
rising trend subsequent to the debt crisis of the early 1980s
(figure 2). This trend was analogous to the evolution of
the SPI for Latin America as a whole, but it was also a
mirror image of the declining trend in the international
interest rate. The international interest rate is a crucial
variable for Latin America’s economic performance, since
it has a large impact on the external debt service and capital
inflows into the region. Figure 2 also shows the changes
in all three variables in order to sweep out temporal trends.
Given the short time dimension of our panel, a
straightforward inspection would, in general, be a risky
way of determining any relationship among the variables.
However, it seems quite clear that changes in growth are
still a mirror image of changes in the interest rate.
The situation described presents two simultaneous
problems that must be considered. The first one is the
influence of international factors, which make it difficult
to tell if growth was enhanced because of better policies
or, for instance, a lower international interest rate. The
second problem is the risk of spurious correlation, given
the temporal trend shown by growth and the structural
reforms. In order to partially address these problems,
the estimation procedure must control for the
international economic environment and the temporal
trend within growth and any explanatory variable.
2. Panel data and growth regressions
Several authors have asserted the importance of panel
data for growth regressions.5 The panel structure
presents fundamental advantages over cross-section
growth regressions, offering more degrees of freedom,
instruments to control endogeneity, and mechanisms
to control for individual and time effects.
The gain in degrees of freedom is crucial when
we are interested in a region or subset of countries
with similar characteristics. The usual cross-section
methodology employs regional dummies to allow for
different intercepts among regions. However, with this
procedure one should accept that the marginal effect
of any explanatory variable is the same in an OECD,
African or Latin American country. Thus, the gain in
degrees of freedom provided by panel data facilitates
study of just a subset of countries, rendering the
implicit assumption of parameter homogeneity more
plausible.
Another fundamental advantage of panel data is
the time series structure, which provides valid
instruments by using lagged values for the explanatory
variables. Because almost any explanatory variable in
growth regressions could be considered endogenous,
the availability of valid instruments is paramount if
consistent estimates are to be obtained.
5 See Islam (1995) and Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996).
FIGURE 2
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Lastly, and most fundamentally, panel data models
are the only way to control for individual and time
effects. When fixed effects are not controlled for, a
problem of omitted variables is present and the
estimated coefficients will be biased, unless we use the
implausible assumption of orthogonality between the
effects and the explanatory variables. It is particularly
important to consider time effects when dealing with
underdeveloped countries since, as the preceding
section illustrated, their economies depend greatly on
the international economic environment. Meanwhile,
controlling for individual effects is also of the greatest
importance, because we can hardly conceive of country-
specific variables explaining growth and not being
correlated with the unobserved economic and social
capacities of that country. In addition, when lags of the
dependent variable are used as an explanatory variable,
as they are in most cross-section studies, the implausible
assumption of orthogonality is necessarily violated, as
Caselli, Esquivel and Lefort (1996, p. 367) correctly
point out.
3. Estimation procedure
The panel data models to be estimated (see appendix
B) have the general form:6
yit = xit’β + ηt + αi + νit
i = 1,2,….,N. t = 1,2,…,T. [1]
where x
it
 is a K x 1 vector of explanatory variables
that can contain the dependent variable lagged one
period, endogenous but weakly exogenous regressors
(E[x1
it
 vis] = 0 for t < s), and strictly exogenous
regressors (E[x2
it
 vis] = 0 for all t,s); β  is a K x 1 vector
of constants; ηt and αi are the unobserved time and
individual specific effects, respectively; and νit is a
serially uncorrelated random disturbance.
The specifications are fixed-effect models in the
sense that ηt and αi are fixed constants and not random
disturbance that can be incorporated into the error term.
The fixed-effect specification is the appropriate one
since we are focusing on a specific set of countries over
specific periods, and thus the effects have not been
randomly drawn from a large population.
Following Anderson and Hsiao (1981), we control
the individual effects by setting [1] in first-difference
form.7 Note that this transformation also removes any
temporal trend within the variables.8 To control the time
effects, these will actually be estimated using time-
dummy variables. Lastly, observe that due to perfect
multicolinearity the fixed-effect specification prevents
identification of the coefficients of any time or
individual invariant variable. Consequently, the actual
models to be estimated have the general form:
∆yit = ∆xit’ β + dt’ φ + ∆vit
i = 1,2,….,N. t = 2,…,T. [2]
where dt is a (T-2) x 1 vector of dummies representing
the periods 3,4,...., and φ is a (T-2) x 1 vector of
constants. On the assumption that vit is serially
uncorrelated, any value of yit or x
1
it
 lagged two or more
periods is a valid instrument for the first-difference
equation, and thus with T ≥ 3 we can do a consistent
estimation of [2].9
To gain efficiency, we use a variant of the two-
step GMM estimator proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991). Exploiting a set of orthogonality conditions
implied by our assumptions on the error term and
regressors, we use the instrumental matrix W = ( Z, d),
where d is the matrix of time dummies, Z = (Z1’,…, ZN’)’,





∆x2it’). The estimation is done in two steps. First, an
instrumental variable estimation of [2] is performed
employing the matrix W.10 Second, the residuals of this
6 Even if in actual estimation we work with unbalanced panels, for
notational simplicity in this section we assume balanced panels.
7 Note that if x
it
 contains any lag of yit, the within estimator is
inconsistent because (yit–s – yi) and (vit – vi) are correlated since the
latter average contains vit-s.
8 The model in first differences can exacerbate the inconsistency
generated by measurement errors when the explanatory variable has
a temporal trend, which is the case with the policy indices.
Notwithstanding, it is important to note that the bias always has the
opposite sign to the coefficient’s (“attenuation bias”), so measurement
errors can generate lack of statistical significance, but not coefficients
with the wrong sign. However, in general the use of mainly policy
variables –not macroeconomic aggregates– in the construction of
the indices minimizes the risk of measurement errors.
9 Note that if we have yit-1 on the right-hand side of [1], we always
have endogeneity of regressors in [2], since E[∆yit-1 ∆vit] ≠ 0 due to
the fact that yit-1 and vit-1 are correlated.
10 In this first step, Arellano and Bond (1991) perform an
instrumental variable-GLS estimation where the weighted matrix
Hi is a (T-1) square matrix with twos in the main diagonal, minus
ones in the main sub-diagonals and zeroes otherwise, representing
the provisional assumption that vit is homoscedastic. Since any
positive definite matrix produces a consistent estimation, instead
of Hi we are using the identity matrix.
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first estimation are used to estimate an unrestricted
covariance matrix, and an instrumental variable-
generalized least squares (GLS) estimation of [2] is
performed using again the matrix W. Lastly, we conduct
a Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions to test the
validity of the instruments and, in order to check
multicolinearity problems, we compute the condition
number of the matrix of explanatory variables in [2].
11 However, usually only exclusion restrictions are applied to D.
IV
Extreme bound analysis (EBA)
To test the robustness of the correlation between the
structural reforms and growth, we use a variant of the
extreme bound analysis (EBA) suggested by Leamer
(1983) and used in growth regressions by Levine and
Renelt (1992). EBA is a formal specification search that
seeks to estimate the size of model uncertainty by
systematically changing the conditioning set of
information.
The explanatory variables are classified as the focus
variable, the free variables (I) and doubtful variables
(D). The focus variable is the variable in whose
coefficient (β
F
) we are interested. The I and focus
variables are always in the information set, whereas
the D variables can be combined in any arbitrary linear
fashion.11
For a given level of confidence, the upper (lower)
extreme bound for β
F
 is the estimate corresponding to
the highest upper (lowest bottom) bound out of all the
confidence intervals of the different estimates of β
F
.
The linkage between the focus variable and the
dependent variable is considered robust if β
F
 remains
significant and with the same sign at the extreme
bounds. Otherwise, the linkage is defined as fragile.
This extreme bound analysis is particularly
pertinent when dealing with ad hoc models that are not
supported by a well founded theory and consequently
have higher uncertainty in relation to the true model.
However, there have been serious criticisms of EBA,
specifically in relation to the decision rule for defining
a variable as fragile, the risk of introducing
multicolinearity, and the risk of omitting relevant
variables. Sala-i-Martin (1997) argues that when EBA
is used no variable will be robust, since it is enough to
find an exception where β
F
 becomes insignificant to
regard the focus variable as fragile. The problem with
this argument is that the converse is also true: estimating
different specifications in ad hoc regressions usually
yields a model where β
F
 is significant and of the desired
sign. Therefore, the debate is more precisely about how
many successes and how many failures in significance
or sign should be deemed to determine that a variable
is robust or fragile. Sala-i-Martin answers this question
by constructing an empirical probability distribution
for β
F
. Given the practical problems associated with
such analysis,12 the “how much is enough” question
does not have an objective answer. For instance, when
dealing with structural reforms that change entire
countries, how many exceptions should we allow before
we conclude that the evidence is strong or weak? Still,
to partially address this criticism, we try to be as
descriptive as possible in reporting the EBA results.
Consequently, our EBA will report the extreme bounds,
the value and statistical significance of the focus
coefficient in the best specification selected according
to the Akaike (AIC) information criterion, and the
proportion of positive (negative) and significant
(insignificant) coefficients found for each focus
variable.
Another important criticism is that the EBA can
introduce irrelevant variables correlated with the rest
of the explanatory variables, thereby inflating the
standard errors of the estimated coefficients. However,
as long as the causal channels are not clear, a
multicolinearity problem may simply mean that the data
evidence is weak (Leamer, 1983, p. 34).
Notwithstanding, as a rule of thumb to control this
problem we will eliminate any D variable with a
correlation coefficient greater than 0.5 with respect to
the focus variables, and we will never include in the
models D variables with a correlation coefficient greater
than 0.5 with respect to one another. Lastly, as stated in
the preceding section, in all regressions we will check
for multicolinearity using the condition number of the
12 To construct the empirical probability distribution for ß
F
, Sala-i-
Martin ran two million regressions.
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matrix of regressors. Any model with a condition
number larger than 20 will not be considered for the
EBA.
A further and more fundamental criticism is that
the EBA can omit relevant variables, making the
estimates of β
F
 and Var (β
F
) biased. However, this
criticism is just a reminder of the weakness of inferences
drawn from any ad hoc model, and as long as the EBA
uses plausible models, the methodology illustrates
rather than causes this problem. Nonetheless, since the
best way to minimize the risk of relevant variables being
omitted is to rely on a well established theory, the
starting point for our analysis will be the augmented
Solow model as proposed by Mankiw, Romer and Weil
(1992), and the I variables for the growth regressions
will be an empirical application of this model.
V
Data, models and classification of variables
1. The starting point: the augmented Solow model
We start our analysis by estimating the model
∆lnGDPit = µ + (ρ – 1) lnGDPi,t-1 + β1 lnINVi,t
+ β2 lnPROTi,t + β3 lnPOPi,t + ηt + αi + vit [4]
The model represents an empirical approximation
to the augmented Solow model proposed by Mankiw,
Romer and Weil (1992), where GDP is income per capita;
PROT is the rate of growth in the average daily protein
intake, used as a proxy for human capital growth;13 INV
represents the investment coefficient and is used as a
proxy for physical capital growth, and POP is population
growth. Taking first differences to control for individual
fixed effects, using time dummies to control for time
effects, and managing terms with the dependent
variable, the model can be estimated as
∆lnGDPit = ρ∆lnGDPi,t-1 + β1 ∆lnINVi,t
+ β
2 ∆lnPROTi,t + β3 ∆lnPOPi,t [5]
 + Σj φ j dtj + ∆vit
where d 
j are the time dummies and j = 3,…,T.
In the Solow framework, the only sources of
growth are factor accumulation and the unobserved
growth of total factor productivity (g). For this reason,
our analysis uses three different dependent variables
as proxies for growth and its sources: ∆lnGDP
representing growth, lnINV representing factor
accumulation,14 and RES, the residuals of our estimated
Solow model, as a proxy for the unobserved g.
2. Data and classification of variables
Appendix C lists the variables employed in this study,
describing each one with its respective source. The main
source of the data is IDB.
The paper analyses six focus variables in our EBA:
the five reform indices, namely trade liberalization
(TRADE), tax neutrality (TAX), financial liberalization
(FIN), privatization (PRIV) and labour deregulation (LAB);
the arithmetic mean of the indices (SPI); its standard
deviation (SIGMA); and policy complementarity,
represented as SPI-SIGMA (POLCOM).
The Solow framework also dictates the variables
that must theoretically always be included in growth
regressions. Therefore, when the dependent variable is
∆lnGDP, the I variables are lnGDP_1, lnPROT, lnINV
and lnPOP. For the regressions where the dependent
variable is lnINV, the I variables are lnGDP_1, lnPROT
and lnPOP, and when the dependent variable is RES, we
do not use any I variables.
Eight doubtful variables were selected out of the
wide range of variables used in the literature: annual
terms of trade growth (TOT), annual inflation (INF),
government surplus (GOV), external public debt (DEBT),
13 To represent human capital accumulation, we chose a nutritional
variable (PROT) over the school attainment indicators used by most
empirical studies of growth. The reason is twofold. First, quality
factors are not taken into account when school attainment indicators
are used, even though they are crucial if meaningful school
indicators are to be obtained in developing countries. Second, when
indicators such as average years of schooling or enrolment rates
are used, it is never clear if they represent the level or growth of
human capital.
14 We exclude human capital growth and population growth since
there are no clear channels through which structural reforms can
improve them.
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standard deviation of reform indices (SIGMA), financial
flows from international organizations (FLOWS), current
account surplus (CA) and domestic credit growth
(DOCRE). Most of these variables are commonly used
in the literature as indicators of short-term policies (GOV
and DOCRE), the external situation (CA and DEBT), the
situation of international goods markets (TOT) and
macroeconomic stability (INF). FLOWS was also included
because capital inflows from international financial
organizations have a decisive impact on the economic
performance of developing countries. Lastly, SIGMA was
also selected to control for heterogeneity in the reform
process.
3. The models
Every model will include the respective I variables, the
focus variable and up to two doubtful variables.
Therefore, including the time dummies, we have up to
10 regressors in the ∆lnGDP regressions, up to 9 in the
lnINV regressions, and up to three in the RES
regressions.15 Table 2 shows the correlation matrix for
the variables used in the analysis.
As mentioned in Section 4, any doubtful variable
with a correlation coefficient greater than 0.5 with
respect to the focus variables has been eliminated. In
addition, DEBT and CA, DEBT and GOVSUR, INF and
GOVSUR, DOCRE and INF and DOCRE and GOVSUR never
enter the same regression, since their respective
correlation coefficients are greater than 0.5.
4. Endogenous and exogenous variables
We assume that all the variables, with the exception of
TOT and the focus variables, are endogenous with respect
to growth.16 Since INV and RES are sources of growth,
we consider the endogeneity assumptions valid for the
regressions with any of our three dependent variables.
Note that growth in the terms of trade (TOT) is clearly
exogenous. However, we consider financial flows
(FLOWS) endogenous, since the assistance of
international financial organizations usually comes in
periods of poor economic performance. Lastly, all the
focus variables are considered exogenous, on the
assumption that they depend exclusively on policy
decisions.
15 When the dependent variable is RES, the regressions do not include
time dummies.
16 Note that, as was demonstrated in Section 3, GDP_1 is
endogenous in the model in first differences, as they were included
for the RES calculation.
TABLE 2
Correlation matrix
∆lnGDP InINV RES InGDP_1 InPROT InPOP CA DEBT FLOWS INF TOT GOVSUR DOCRE FIN LAB PRIV TAX TRADE SPI SIGMA POLCOM
∆lnGDP 1.00
InINV 0.34 1.00
RES 0.32 -0.04 1.00
InGDP_1 0.11 -0.08 0.11 1.00
InPROT 0.20 0.08 0.08 0.01 1.00
InPOP -0.09 0.21 -0.02 -0.49 0.03 1.00
CA 0.09 -0.23 0.11 0.65 0.12 -0.33 1.00
DEBT -0.41 0.01 -0.16 -0.47 -0.16 0.16 -0.57 1.00
FLOWS -0.27 -0.20 -0.33 -0.32 -0.12 0.27 -0.18 0.41 1.00
INF -0.46 -0.09 -0.02 0.04 -0.10 0.00 -0.22 0.40 -0.04 1.00
TOT 0.07 0.20 -0.16 -0.17 -0.02 0.03 -0.26 0.13 0.06 -0.06 1.00
GOVSUR 0.45 0.24 -0.03 0.17 0.20 -0.13 0.34 -0.48 -0.17 -0.69 0.22 1.00
DOCRE -0.41 -0.12 -0.09 0.07 -0.07 0.02 -0.20 0.38 0.05 0.94 -0.11 -0.72 1.00
FIN 0.37 -0.07 -0.17 0.11 -0.01 -0.31 -0.02 -0.11 0.12 -0.20 0.11 0.10 -0.10 1.00
LAB 0.18 0.36 -0.07 0.03 -0.02 -0.38 0.04 -0.10 -0.36 -0.18 0.20 0.23 -0.19 0.12 1.00
PRIV 0.24 0.18 -0.06 0.18 -0.02 -0.17 -0.06 0.07 0.09 -0.14 0.11 0.13 -0.11 0.25 0.03 1.00
TAX 0.33 0.04 -0.03 -0.33 0.16 0.12 -0.13 -0.03 -0.01 -0.13 0.06 0.25 -0.08 0.14 -0.02 0.03 1.00
TRADE 0.39 0.11 -0.05 -0.12 0.06 -0.07 -0.19 0.06 -0.06 -0.18 0.10 0.13 -0.15 0.42 0.04 0.37 0.47 1.00
SPI 0.51 0.18 -0.14 -0.01 0.04 -0.30 -0.11 -0.05 -0.05 -0.28 0.19 0.26 -0.21 0.75 0.37 0.55 0.47 0.78 1.00
SIGMA 0.06 -0.05 -0.09 -0.31 -0.04 -0.19 -0.11 0.08 -0.06 -0.09 0.06 0.05 -0.10 0.21 0.37 -0.34 0.43 0.49 0.38 1.00
POLCOM 0.52 0.21 -0.11 0.14 0.07 -0.23 -0.07 -0.09 -0.02 -0.26 0.17 0.26 -0.18 0.70 0.21 0.76 0.29 0.60 0.89 -0.08 1.00
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VI
Econometric Results
1. The Solow model
Table 3 shows our estimated Solow model. We report
the estimates of the first and second steps, but only refer
to these latter results.
All the explanatory variables have the theoretically
predicted sign, and all but lnPROT are significant at
the 95% confidence level. Note the strong significance
of the coefficient of investment, which was the only
variable robustly correlated with growth in the Levine
and Renelt (1992) study, and also the strong significance
of the negative coefficient of GDP per capita lagged by
one period, verifying the existence of conditional
convergence. The routine F-test of joint significance
strongly rebuts the null hypothesis. In addition, the
critical value for the Sargan test using the 95%
confidence level is χ2
20 
= 31.41, and therefore we cannot
reject the null hypothesis of validity of instruments.
Lastly, the condition number of the matrix of explanatory
variables does not show multicolinearity problems.
2. Correlation matrix
The correlation matrix of table 2 has illustrated some
results. All indices in that matrix show the expected
correlation with growth and investment, with the
exception of SIGMA (wrong sign with respect to growth)
and FIN (wrong sign with respect to investment). Note
also the high correlation between growth and SPI before
controlling for temporal trends.
A surprising result in this step is the negative
correlation of all the indices and policy
complementarity with respect to RES, our proxy for the
unobserved growth of total factor productivity. The only
focus variable whose correlation coefficient with
respect to RES shows the expected sign is SIGMA. These
results are all the more startling considering that the
most natural way that free-market policies can enhance
growth is by improving resource allocation.
3. EBA results
Table 4 reports the extreme bounds of β
F
 for every focus
variable, and the value of β
F
 in the respective best
specification according to the AIC criterion. Appendix
D describes in more detail the corresponding models
and the econometric results.
The EBA shows that no focus variable is robustly
correlated in the theoretically expected manner with
growth or its sources. This lack of robustness includes
the average of the policy indices (SPI) and policy
complementarity (POLCOM = SPI - SIGMA). Note that the
regressions with POLCOM represent the restricted version





However, the unrestricted models also yield fragility.
In fact, the lowest bound for SPI in the growth
regressions includes SIGMA as a doubtful variable (see
appendix D).
The only robust relationship is LAB with the
residuals of the Solow model, but the correlation is
negative, indicating that labour deregulation is actually
harming productivity growth. Even if fragile, the best
performing focus variable is SIGMA, whose coefficient
always has the expected sign in the residuals
regressions, indicating that policy dispersion reduces
growth by decreasing total factor productivity.
Table 4 also shows that FIN, LAB, TRADE and SPI in
the case of growth regressions, FIN, TAX and SPI in the
case of investment regressions and FIN, PRIV, TRADE and
SPI in the case of the residuals regressions enter the best
specification with negative sign. Therefore, in a
systematic and objective search for the best
specification, we should conclude that these reforms
are decreasing growth, investment, and productivity
growth, respectively.
Table 5 reports the distribution of β
F 
according to
sign and significance. The table shows that fragility is
not caused by just a few exceptions. Rather, FIN, LAB
and SPI in the growth regressions, and FIN and SPI in the
residuals regressions, show mostly negative correlation
with the dependent variables. With respect to investment,
the focus variables are generally insignificant.
4. Bad luck or bad policy?
Since we are controlling for time effects, the EBA’s
results raise serious doubts about the effectiveness of
the policy reforms, irrespective of whether the
international factors were positive or negative. However,
Easterly, Loayza and Montiel (1997) echo the
consensus viewpoint when they argue that the reason
Latin America’s economic performance was poor in
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Growth Investment Residualsb
High Best Low High Best Low High Best Low
FIN: financial liberalization 0.0306 -0.0500 -0.2086 0.2771 -0.0284 -0.1947 -0.0351  -0.0782c -0.0763
0.0913 0.0452 0.1068 0.1995 0.0406 0.1784 0.0451 0.0193 0.0396
LAB: labour deregulation -0.0708 -0.4487 -1.0691 2.6815 0.7962 -0.5184  -0.3752c  -0.4932c  -0.5306c
0.6592 0.3642 0.6490 1.5789 0.6296 1.2935 0.0403 0.0266 0.0475
PRIV: privatization 0.1986 0.0559 -0.2646 -0.3065 0.0309 -0.4752  0.0400c  -0.1658c  -0.1626c
0.2014 0.0522 0.1398 0.4362 0.0641 0.4748 0.0191 0.0060 0.0154
TAX: tax neutrality 0.1215 0.0927 0.0110 0.2099 -0.0901  -0.3488c 0.0889c 0.0813c  -0.0547c
0.0779 0.0493 0.1230 0.2329 0.0953 0.1394 0.0170 0.0162 0.0158
TRADE: trade liberalization 0.1441 -0.0325 -0.1023 0.1791 0.1093 -0.2531  0.0641c  -0.0347c 0.0078c
0.1566 0.0440 0.1418 0.3338 0.0941 0.1950 0.0290 0.0079 0.0160
SPI: average of policy indices 0.2421 -0.2262 -0.5974  1.0711c -0.3351 -0.7132 -0.1271  -0.3256c  -0.2260c
0.2658 0.1942 0.4161 0.3578 0.3398 0.5054 0.0997 0.0552 0.1095
SIGMA: standard error of policy indices 0.1576 -0.5455 -0.7131 0.4938 -0.1212  -0.9358c -0.2389  -0.4693c  -0.5180c
0.4115 0.2425 0.3666 0.5869 0.3725 0.4037 0.1524 0.0340 0.0836
POLCOM: policy complementarity 0.1713 0.0914 -0.0581  0.9284c 0.1359 -0.4311 0.0326 -0.0723 -0.0877
(SPI-SIGMA) 0.3123 0.2267 0.2606 0.4628 0.0852 0.4504 0.0849 0.0373 0.0770
a Standard errors in italics.
High βF : Focus coefficient of the regression with the highest bound (βF + two s.e.).
Best βF : Focus coefficient of the regression with the best Akaike information criterion (AIC) value.
Low βF : Focus coefficient of the regression with the lowest bound (βF - two s.e.).
With the exception of SIGMA, the expected sign of the coefficients is positive.
b Residuals of the estimated Solow model.
c Coefficient significant at 5% of significance.
TABLE 4
Extreme bound analysisa
spite of the reforms was that the international economic
environment was unfavourable.
Yet the time dummies contained in the estimated
Solow model reported in table 3 are all positive,
indicating that the international situation in the period
under consideration was, if anything, favourable to
Latin America. This result is consistent with the
behaviour of the international interest rate, as was
highlighted in Section III.17
TABLE 3
Estimation of Solow model
Dependent variable: ∆lnGDP
First step Second step
β s.e. t β s.e. t
∆lnGDP_1 -0.811 0.161 -5.034 -0.811 0.101 -8.070
∆lnPROT 0.157 0.170 0.922 0.134 0.084 1.607
∆lnINV 0.276 0.093 2.962 0.305 0.029 10.608
∆lnPOP -0.020 0.062 -0.313 -0.040 0.017 -2.345
Dummy variable 87-89 0.014 0.019 0.744 0.002 0.008 0.183
Dummy variable 90-92 0.004 0.026 0.159 0.011 0.013 0.837
Dummy variable 93-95 0.023 0.025 0.944 0.025 0.009 2.696
No. of observations 57 57
R2 0.420 0.403




Condition no. 2.199 2.199
17 As was also mentioned in Section III, the fixed-effect specification
prevents identification of the coefficients of any time or individual
invariant variable. Hence, technically we cannot dismiss the
C E P A L  R E V I E W  7 6  •  A P R I L  2 0 0 298
STRUCTURAL REFORMS AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN LATIN AMERICA: A SENSITIVITY ANALYSIS  •  RAFAEL CORREA
VII
Conclusions
Considering all these premises, the study shows
that the evidence for the positive effects of structural
reforms on Latin American growth is far from
conclusive. In fact, our analysis raises serious doubts
about the effectiveness of the policy reforms, since no
reform is robustly correlated with growth or its sources
with the expected sign; frequently, the reforms enter
the respective best specifications for growth and its
sources with a negative sign; and it is not difficult to
find specifications where the reform indices have
significant negative coefficients.
What is more, the only robust relationship found
in our analysis is a negative correlation between labour
possibility that this favourable situation may actually be the result
of higher regional SPI by period. Given the EBA results, however, it
is improbable that whereas country-specific changes in the SPI are
not robustly correlated with growth, changes in the regional average
are.
TABLE 5
Sign and significance of the focus coefficientsa
(Percentages)
Growth Investment Residualsb
βF positive βF negative βF positive βF negative βF positive βF negative
Sc NSd NS S S NS NS S S NS NS S
FIN:
Financial liberalization 0 14 75 9 28 59 9 3 0 0 38 63
LAB:
Labour deregulation 0 0 44 5 28 63 9 0 0 0 0 100
PRIV:
Privatization 13 66 16 6 0 59 4 0 13 38 2 28
TAX:
Tax neutrality 3 66 31 0 0 31 4 25 22 6 31 41
TRADE:
Trade liberalization 0 53 47 0 3 59 38 0 19 6 33 38
SPI:
Average sect. structural
policy indices 0 19 72 9 9 56 34 0 0 0 16 84
SIGMA:
Standard deviation of
structural policy indices 0 13 75 13 4 50 33 13 0 0 4 96
POLCOM: SPI-SIGMA 0 54 46 0 8 54 38 0 4 33 46 17
a Focus coefficients are significant or not significant at 5% of significance level. Number of models: FIN, LAB, PRIV, TAX, TRADE and SPI: 32
models. SIGMA and POLCOM: 24 models.
b Residuals of the Solow model.
c S = Significant.
d NS = Not significant.
This paper has implicitly argued that controlling for
fixed effects, endogeneity, spurious correlation and
model uncertainty, and establishing objective
procedures in model selection to avoid researcher bias,
should be standard procedures in growth regressions,
particularly when the findings have powerful policy
implications.
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deregulation (LAB) and the residuals of the Solow model
(RES), indicating that labour deregulation is harming
productivity. Financial deregulation (FIN) and the
average of the policy indices (SPI) also show only
negative coefficients in the RES regressions, indicating
that, if anything, they are also harming productivity.
Since the free-market reforms of the Washington
Consensus should enhance growth, particularly by
improving resource allocation, these findings strongly
suggest that the Washington Consensus policies are
simply not working in Latin America.
The lack of robustness in the positive correlation
between reforms and growth does not improve when
policy dispersion (SIGMA) is controlled for, even using
a policy complementarity index (POLCOM = SPI - SIGMA)
or simple unrestricted regressions. However, the SIGMA
coefficient generally shows the expected sign when
entering the RES regressions, indicating that reform
heterogeneity is bad for productivity.
Lastly, even if the foregoing conclusions are not
affected by the direction of the time effects during the
period, these effects were positive if anything,
indicating that the poor economic performance of Latin
America was not due to an adverse international
environment. This conclusion is consistent with the
behaviour during the period of the international interest
rate, a crucial variable for regional growth.
This paper has used the same reform indices as
were employed to produce most of the evidence being
questioned, and although there is room to improve these
indices, they represent a major advance in the
measurement of Latin American structural reforms,
since they explicitly incorporate policy variables and
not the assumed outcomes of the reforms.
In future, the availability of longer time series and
perhaps better indices may cast more light on the true
impact of market reforms on Latin American growth.
If the conclusions of the present study are confirmed,
however, urgent research will be needed to understand
how policies aimed at improving resource allocation can
in fact harm productivity. In this endeavour, case studies
might be more illuminating than econometric regressions.
Meanwhile, can anyone suggest accelerating the
reforms?
APPENDIX A
Measuring the structural reforms
The components of the policy indices are:
Financial liberalization:
a) Freedom to set deposit interest rates
b) Freedom to set lending interest rates
c) Real level of bank deposit reserves
d) Quality of banking and financial oversight
Labour deregulation:
a) Flexibility of hiring
b) Cost of dismissal after one year of work
c) Cost of dismissal after ten years of work
d) Overtime pay
e) Social security contributions
Privatization:
Privatization proceeds accrued since 1988
Tax neutrality:
a) Top marginal income tax rate for corporations
b) Top marginal income tax rate for individuals
c) Basic value-added tax rate




Quantifying every observation of the respective policy variable in
such a way that higher values represent greater neutrality, the value
of every index R for country j in year t is given by the function
where n is the number of policy variables included in index R, xit is
the observation of variable i for country j in year t, and xi (xi )
is the minimum (maximum) value observed for variable i across





a) Consistent estimation of β
Assuming balanced panels for notational simplicity, the
models to be estimated have the general form:
yit = xit’β + ηt + αi +vit
i = 1,2,….,N.  t = 2,…,T. [B.1]
where x
it
 is a K x 1 vector of explanatory variables that can contain
the dependent variable lagged one period, endogenous regressors
18 Defined as the ratio between the basic rate and actual collection
as a percentage of GDP.
(E[x1
it
 vis] ≠ 0 for t = s) and strictly exogenous regressors (E[x
2
it
 vis] = 0
for all t,s ); β  is a K x 1 vector of constants; ηt and αi are the
unobserved time and individual specific effects, respectively; vit is
the error term; and in general E[αi | xit] ≠ 0.
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Taking first differences to sweep out the individual effects,
and introducing dummies to estimate the time effects, we have:
∆yit = ∆xit’ β  + dt’ φ + ∆vit
i = 1,2,….,N. t = 2,…,T. [B.2]
where dt is a (T-2) x 1 vector of dummies representing the periods
3,4,…, and φ is a (T-2) x 1 vector of constants. If we have y
it-1
 on
the right-hand side of [B.1], OLS estimation of β in [B.2] is
inconsistent. In this case, we have endogeneity of regressors since
E[∆yit-1 ∆vit] ≠ 0 due to the fact that yit-1 and vit-1 are correlated. A
similar problem arises if we consider some x
it 
variables as
endogenous. However, if we assume vit is serially uncorrelated,
and the endogenous regressors are weakly exogenous in the sense
that E[x1it vis] = 0 for t < s, any value of yit or x
1
it lagged two or
more periods are valid instruments for [B.2], since E[yit-2∆vit] = 0
and
 
E[x1it-2∆vit] = 0. Therefore, under the former identifying
assumptions and having T ≥ 3, there are instruments for the
consistent estimation of β.





proposed by Arellano and Bond
(1991)
 
uses the instrumental matrix WAB = (ZAB, d), where d is














iT’). This instrumental matrix
exploits optimally the orthogonality with respect to ∆vit of values
of yit and x
1
it lagged two or more periods and all values of x
2
it. In
actual estimation we use a subset of the former orthogonality
conditions, choosing the instrumental matrix W = (Z, d), where




it-2’; ∆x2i3’, …, ∆x2it’).
The estimation is done in two steps. Firstly, an instrumental
variable estimation of [B.2] is performed using matrix W. This
estimation is consistent but inefficient if ∆vit is not homoscedastic.
Using the residuals of this first estimation, an unrestricted
covariance matrix for ∆vit is estimated and an estimation is carried
out for [B.2], once again using the matrix W and the covariance
matrix previously estimated.
Defining, ∆X ÷÷ ÷÷ ÷ = [∆X, d ] the two-step GMM estimator has the form:
b§§ §§ § = [(∆X ÷÷ ÷÷ ÷’W)AN(W’∆X ÷÷ ÷÷ ÷)]
–1
 [(∆X ÷÷ ÷÷ ÷’W)AN(W’∆Y)] [B.3]
where AN = [ΣWi (∆n§§ §§ §i) (∆v §§ §§ §i)’Wi]
–1
 and where ∆v §§ §§ §i  is  the vector of
residuals of the first step estimation, ignoring A
N
 in [B.3].
c) Sargan test of over-identifying restrictions
Since we have more instruments than parameters to be estimated,
the models are over-identified. Using these over-identifying restrictions,
we can test the validity of instruments using the statistic
s = ∆nÿÿ ÿÿ ÿæ W [ΣW æ (∆nÿÿ ÿÿ ÿi) (∆nÿÿ ÿÿ ÿi)æWi]
–1
 W æ∆nÿÿ ÿÿ ÿ [B.4]
where  ∆v is the vector of residuals of the second step. Under the
null hypothesis of validity of instruments, the s statistic is
asymptotically distributed as χ , where r is the number of over-
identifying restrictions, i.e., the difference between the columns of
W and the number of estimated coefficients. A rejection of the null
hypothesis suggests, for instance, that one of our assumptions
–residuals not autocorrelated in [B.1] and/or endogenous but weakly









FIN : financial liberalization index. Source: IDB.
LAB : labour deregulation index. Source: IDB.
PRIV : privatization index. Source: IDB.
TAX : tax neutrality index. Source: IDB.
TRADE : trade liberalization index. Source: IDB.
SPI : structural policy index, defined as the arithmetic mean of the five policy indices. Source: IDB.
SIGMA : dispersion of the indices, defined as the standard deviation of the five policy indices.
POLCOM : policy complementarity, defined as SPI-SIGMA.
b) Other variables
CA : non-factorial current-account surplus in constant dollars as a percentage of GDP. Source: IDB.
DEBT : external public and publicly guaranteed external debt in constant dollars as a percentage of GDP. Source: IDB.
DOCRE : log of (1 + growth of domestic credit at end of period). Source: IDB.
FLOWS : net financial flows in current dollars from international financial organizations as percentage of GDP. Sources: World
Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF).
GDP : GDP per capita in constant dollars. Source: IDB.
GOVSUR : current-account surplus (current revenues minus current expenditure) of the government, in current local currency, as a
percentage of GDP. Source: IDB.
INF : log of (1 + average annual inflation). Source: IMF.
INV : gross investment in constant local currency as percentage of GDP. Source: IDB.
POP : annual growth rate of total population. Source: IDB.
PROT : (1 + annual growth rate of the average daily intake of proteins). Source: IDB.
RES : residuals of the estimated Solow model.
TOT : log of (1 + growth rate of terms of trade). Source: World Bank.
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APPENDIX D
Extreme bound analysisa
Dependent variable : ∆lnGDP
I variables : lnGDP_1, lnPROT, lnINV and lnPOP
Focus variable B s.e.b t R2 AICc D variables Obsd Sargan No. of cond.
FIN: high: 0.0306 0.0913 0.3348 0.4571 -5.4092 DEBT, FLOWS 57 χ2
35
 = 28.61 3.95
Financial best: -0.0500 0.0452 -1.1053 0.5188 -5.5297 DEBT, DOCRE 57 χ2
35
 = 9.35 4.64
liberalization low: -0.2086 0.1068 -1.9538 0.3245 -5.1906 TOT, DOCRE 57 χ2
35
 = 24.18 3.44
LAB: high: -0.0708 0.6592 -0.1074 0.3708 -5.2616 FLOWS, DOCRE 57 χ2
35
 = 32.2 3.76
Labour best: -0.4487 0.3642 -1.2320 0.5487 -5.5940 DEBT, DOCRE 57 χ2
35
 = 10.58 3.95
deregulation low: -1.0691 0.6490 -1.6473 0.4347 -5.3687 DEBT, FLOWS 57 χ2
35
 = 28.53 3.45
PRIV: high: 0.1986 0.2014 0.9861 0.3351 -5.2069 DEBT, SIGMA 52 χ2
35
 = 7.17 5.87
Privatization best: 0.0559 0.0522 1.0724 0.4901 -5.4719 DEBT, FLOWS 57 χ2
35
 = 7.85 4.07
low: -0.2646 0.1398 -1.8921 0.4.69 -5.3212 SIGMA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
35
 = 20.28 4.46
TAX: high: 0.1215 0.0779 1.5609 0.3689 -5.2585 FLOWS, DOCRE 57 χ2
35
 = 2.83 4.02
Tax best: 0.0927 0.0493 1.8806 0.5013 -5.4940 DEBT, TOT 57 χ2
35
 = 4.14 7.02
neutrality low: 0.0110 0.1230 0.0891 0.4187 -5.3413 SIGMA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
35
 = 8.04 4.88
TRADE: high: 0.1441 0.1566 0.9200 0.3798 -5.2765 DEBT, INF 52 χ2
35
 = 20.14 5.39
Trade best: -0.0325 0.0440 -0.7389 0.4525 -5.4396 DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 18.33 4.61
liberalization low: -0.1023 0.1418 -0.7214 0.4622 -5.4190 DEBT, DOCRE 52 χ2
35
 = 24.79 5.48
SPI: high: 0.2421 0.2658 0.9110 0.2300 -5.0986 INF 52 χ2
30
 = 34.41 6.41
Average sect. best: -0.2262 0.1942 -1.1645 0.4687 -5.4313 FLOWS, DOCRE 52 χ2
35
 = 17.54 7.19
structural policy low: -0.5974 0.4161 -1.4357 0.3326 -5.2031 SIGMA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
35
 = 14.38 6.66
indices
SIGMA: high: 0.1025 0.4386 0.2318 0.4344 -5.3686 DEBT, TOT 52 χ2
35
 = 27.10 3.65
Standard deviation best: -0.5455 0.2425 -2.2493 0.4441 -5.4244 DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 24.37 3.70
of structural policy low: -0.7131 0.3666 -1.9448 0.3052 -5.1629 TOT 52 ... 2.32
indices
POLCOM: high: 0.1713 0.3123 0.5484 0.3518 -5.2709 GOVSUR 52 χ2
30
 = 32.28 4.47
SPI-SIGMA best: 0.0914 0.2267 0.4029 0.4615 -5.4180 DEBT, DOCRE 52 χ2
35
 = 25.15 6.55
low: -0.0581 0.2606 -0.2231 0.3386 -5.2121 TOT, GOVSUR 52 χ2
35
 = 26.28 6.19
a High βF : focus coefficient of the regression with the highest bound (βF + two s.e.).
Best βF : focus coefficient of the regression with the lowest AIC.
Low βF : focus coefficient of the regression with the lowest bound (βF - two s.e.).
b s.e.: standard error.
c AIC: Akaike information criterion.
d Number of observations.
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APPENDIX D (Continued)
Dependent variable : lnINV
I variables : lnGDP_1, lnPROT and lnPOP
Focus variable B s.e.b t R2 AICc D variables Obsd Sargan No. of cond.
FIN: high: 0.2771 0.1995 1.3886 0.1092 -3.4901 TOT, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 13.80 3.03
Financial best: -0.0284 0.0406 -0.7000 0.6151 -4.3293 CA, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 14.69 2.82
liberalization low: -0.1947 0.1784 -1.0914 0.2426 -3.6523 FLOWS, INF 57 χ2
30
 = 18.42 3.33
LAB: high: 2.6815 1.5789 1.6983 -0.1168 -3.2640 FLOWS, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 16.38 2.50
Labour best: 0.7962 0.6296 1.2646 0.6385 -4.3921 CA, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 9.81 2.24
deregulation low: -0.5184 1.2935 -0.4008 -0.1063 -3.4774 SIGMA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
30
 = 14.72 2.41
PRIV: high: -0.3065 0.4362 -0.7027 0.0289 -3.6078 SIGMA, GOVSU 52 χ2
30
 = 13.12 4.05
Privatization best: 0.0309 0.0641 0.4818 0.6577 -4.4466 CA, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 25.31 3.18
low: -0.4752 0.4748 -1.0007 0.0142 -3.5927 DEBT, SIGMA 52 χ2
30
 = 13.97 5.09
TAX: high: 0.2099 0.2329 0.9012 0.2673 -3.6855 DEBT, FLOWS 57 χ2
30
 = 23.24 6.01
Tax best: -0.0901 0.0953 -0.9455 0.6671 -4.4743 CA, DOCRE 57 χ2
30
 = 28.66 2.43
neutrality low: -0.3488 0.1394 -2.5014 -0.0101 -3.5684 SIGMA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
30
 = 3.97 4.75
TRADE: high: 0.1791 0.3338 0.5367 0.1154 -3.7011 DEBT, SIGMA 52 χ2
30
 = 13.29 7.94
Trade best: 0.1093 0.0941 1.1616 0.5181 -4.3084 CA, DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 26.58 3.65
liberalization low: -0.2531 0.1950 -1.2980 0.0279 -3.6068 FLOWS, SIGMA 52 χ2
30
 = 10.21 6.71
SPI: high: 1.0711 0.3578 2.9937 0.0295 -3.6468 DEBT 52 χ2
25
 = 17.31 4.12
Average sect. best: -0.3351 0.3398 -0.9859 0.5155 -4.3031 CA, DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 11.74 5.27
structural policy low: -0.7132 0.5054 -1.4112 0.4070 -4.1010 CA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
30
 = 12.30 5.19
indices
SIGMA: high: 0.4938 0.5869 0.8412 0.1126 -3.6980 FLOWS, INF 52 χ2
30
 = 21.26 4.64
Standard deviation best: -0.1212 0.3725 -0.3255 0.5566 -4.3918 CA, DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 20.71 3.51
of structural policy low: -0.9358 0.4037 -2.3178 0.4888 -4.2495 CA, TOT 52 χ2
30
 = 15.63 5.33
indices
POLCOM: high: 0.9284 0.4628 2.0010 0.3259 -3.9728 CA, GOVSUR 52 χ2
30
 = 13.71 4.40
SPI-SIGMA best: 0.1359 0.0852 1.5956 0.4994 -4.2700 CA, FLOWS 52 χ2
30
 = 14.61 5.31
low: -0.4311 0.4504 -0.9572 -0.0456 -3.5339 DEBT, DOCRE 52 χ2
30
 = 23.11 5.98
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APPENDIX D (Conclusion)
Dependent variable : RES
I variables : none
Focus variable B s.e.b t R2 AICc D variables Obsd Sargan No. of cond.
FIN: high: 0.0351 0.0451 -0.7778 0.1268 -5.6955 DEBT 57 χ2
10
 = 11.44 1.74
Financial best: -0.0783 0.0193 -4.0594 0.1835 -5.7275 DEBT, DOCRE 57 χ2
15
 = 17.92 2.89
liberalization low: -0.0763 0.0396 -1.9274 0.0743 -5.6371 DOCRE 57 χ2
10
 = 10.50 1.74
LAB: high: -0.3752 0.0403 -9.3072 0.1657 -5.6360 TOT, SIGMA 52 ... 1.62
Labour best: -0.4932 0.0266 -18.5364 0.2014 -5.7498 DEBT, DOCRE 57 χ2
15
 = 17.45 2.47
deregulation low: -0.5306 0.0475 -11.1821 0.1718 -5.6433 DEBT, SIGMA 52 χ2
15
 = 17.94 2.82
PRIV: high: 0.0400 0.0191 2.1005 -0.1432 -5.4261 DOCRE 57 χ2
10
 = 10.53 2.65
Privatization best: -0.1658 0.0060 -27.8000 0.1853 -5.6598 TOT, IGMA 52 ... 2.83
low: -0.1627 0.0154 -10.5302 0.0558 -5.5123 CA, SIGMA 52 χ2
15
 = 18.43 1.53
TAX: high: 0.0889 0.0170 5.2280 0.1305 -5.6647 DEBT, TOT 57 χ2
15
 = 15.12 5.30
Tax best: 0.0813 0.0162 5.0182 0.1085 -5.6748 DEBT 57 χ2
10
 = 7.95 5.13
neutrality low: -0.0548 0.0158 -3.4544 0.0211 -5.5462 FLOWS, TOT 57 χ2
15
 = 17.86 1.53
TRADE: high: 0.0641 0.0290 2.2103 0.0731 -5.5691 SIGMA 52 ... 4.60
Trade best: -0.0347 0.0079 -4.4177 0.1224 -5.5854 DEBT, TOT 52 χ2
15
 = 16.60 2.38
liberalization low: -0.0785 0.0160 -4.9100 0.0198 -5.4748 CA, FLOWS 52 χ2
15
 = 18.05 2.37
SPI: high: -0.1271 0.0997 -1.2748 0.0487 -5.5048 FLOWS, GOVSUR 52 χ2
15
 = 18.08 4.21
Average sect. best: -0.3256 0.0552 -5.9012 0.2162 -5.6984 TOT, DOCRE 52 χ2
15
 = 18.46 3.92
structural policy low: -0.2260 0.1095 -2.0648 0.1357 -5.6391 DOCRE 52 χ2
10
 = 16.70 3.21
indices
SIGMA: high: -0.2389 0.1524 -1.5673 0.1137 -5.6140 DEBT 52 χ2
10
 = 14.41 2.59
Standard deviation best: -0.4693 0.0340 -13.8225 -0.0575 -5.3989 CA, INF 52 χ2
15
 = 18.45 2.24
of structural policy low: -0.5180 0.0836 -6.1945 -0.0504 -5.4442 FLOWS 52 χ2
10
 = 11.34 1.40
indices
POLCOM: high: 0.0326 0.0849 0.3846 0.0038 -5.4971 GOVSUR 52 χ2
10
 = 14.17 3.21
SPI-SIGMA best: -0.0723 0.0373 -1.9370 0.1269 -5.5905 DEBT, DOCRE 52 χ2
15
 = 18.65 4.89
low: -0.0877 0.0770 -1.1384 0.0019 -5.5298 none 52 ... ...
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